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The Department of Defense (DoD) is attempting to cut travel costs through a new system, the Defense Travel System (DTS). 
The system is currently well behind schedule and lacking in promised functionality. DTS has not implemented essential 
project management practices. It was developed without the requirements, cost, performance and schedule documents, and 
analyses needed to assess system effectiveness and ROI. The DTS project has failed to keep pace with current technology, 
which is evidence of failure to implement effective software processes. DoD is piloting five-year-old technology and paying to 
modify it. There are features in the original solicitation that are no longer required by DoD personnel, although they are still 
paying for the features. Full deployment of the DTS is not expected until FY 2006. This paper reviews the process that DTS 





The Department of Defense (DoD) is involved in a costly travel management system, the Defense Travel System (DTS), 
which is DoD’s attempt to cut travel expenses. DoD has pushed commercial-off-the-shelf software (COTS) to development 
this system as well as other systems within the DoD since the early 1990’s (DSB). DTS has failed operational testing, 
exceeded all budgets, and missed all deadlines, though promised since 2001. 
 
This paper reviews the process that DTS has followed for development, the missed timelines, the problems that DTS 
encountered, and how the problems could have been avoided. The paper examines prior research on managing large IT 
projects, and reviews other IT projects in the federal government. The paper revisits DoD’s decision to use COTS, discusses 




In March 1993 President Clinton created the National Performance Review (NPR) as an initiative to reform the way the 
federal government worked, by creating a government that worked better for less. He gave NPR a six month deadline with a 
report due by September 1993 (ECPI, 1996). NPR examined the DoD travel reimbursement business process and concluded 
it was convoluted. In 1995 a DoD Travel Project Management Office (PMO) was created to reengineer the entire DoD travel 
process (PMO - DTS). The office pushed laws to simplify the rules for travel entitlements. 
 
The PMO decided that a new DoD travel system was needed; it became known as the Defense Travel System Project 
Management Office (DTS PMO). It wrote specifications for the system in December, 1995 and reviewed similar systems at 
large firms as a benchmark. Benchmarking was a problem because no firms traveled as much as DoD; its personnel file five 
million travel reimbursement vouchers for $5.5 billion annually (Taylor, 2003). The DTS PMO reviewed COTS, because 
NPR wanted to avoid DoD-unique software. COTS was driven by DoD executives, who felt it had to take advantage of 
technology investments in the private sector instead of performing in-house development (DSB, 1994). 
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In June 1997 the PMO released an RFP asking vendors to develop a common user interface to serve all Defense sites 
worldwide, and provide travel management services for Defense Travel Region 6, which included eleven Midwest states. 
DoD divides the U.S. into six regions to allow different contractors to bid on travel management, in order to comply with 
contractual rules concerning small and minority owned businesses. The estimated price of the project was $267 million over 
eight years. The RFP was written so that the contractor would receive a portion of the award for the travel system, but would 
receive most of the funds from fees for each transaction processed through the system by DoD personnel. 
 
DoD was seeking disparate capacities with COTS travel management software and travel services, in addition to the user 
interface. Defense officials specified that the prime contractor had to use a team of partners (Taylor, 2000). In May 1998, a 
contract valued at $263.7 million over five years was awarded to a team of contractors (Saldarini, 2000). The Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) forecasted a decrease in travel spending for 1999 as a result of the system. The Deputy 
Defense Secretary expected the system to save the department $1 million a day, although there were no studies to substantiate 
the claim. However, the cost savings never materialized, because of project delays. See Table 1 for the project timeline. 
 
Table 1. DTS Project Timeline 
 
Year DTS Activity 
1993 NPR review of DoD travel processes 
1995 DTS project office created 
1995 DTS project specifications created 
1997 Request for Proposal released 
1998 Contract awarded - $263.7 million; 120 day initial deployment, 38 month 
final deployment 
1998 3-month delay due to contract dispute 
1999 2-year delay due to firewall incompatibility 
1999 COTS requires major modification to meet project specifications 
2000 Testing declared “successful” 
2001 DoD review of project functionality and technology 
2002 Inspector General recommends project cancellation 
2002 Estimated costs $491.9 M 
2004 Estimated costs $537 M 
 
Problems with Large-scale IT Projects 
 
IT projects commonly exceed budgets and miss deadlines, and 75% of large-scale IS projects are failures (Peterson and Kim, 
2003). Extremely large public project failures are especially troublesome (Montealegre and Keil, 2000). The causes for 
project failures includes misunderstood or changing requirements, lack of an effective development process, poor project 
management, artificial deadlines and poor/nonexistent controls (Schmidt et al., 2001). It is important to understand why specs 
are wrong and why projects are managed poorly (Curran and Connally, 2001). 
 
There are several common characteristics in failed or dysfunctional software projects (Evans et al., 2002). First is the failure 
to apply essential project management practices. Software tasks may be reasonably well planned and implemented, but the 
project runs the risk of failure without project management practices, including cost estimation, project scheduling, earned 
value reporting, performance-based metrics, re-estimation, and quality assurance and testing (Evans et al., 2002).  IT project 
managers may not be equipped to lead projects that are expected to transform a business, and are poorly equipped to set 
technology priorities that affect more than one corporate unit (Curran and Connally, 2001). Metrics and re-estimation often 
provide managers with more information than they care to know (Evans et al., 2002). 
 
The second problem is unwarranted optimism and unrealistic management expectations, which stem from staff members 
having insufficient experience and unrealistic optimism because they are unaware of the magnitude of the tasks (Curran and 
Connally, 2001). Third is failure to implement effective software processes. Adaptation of technology and processes to meet 
the unique challenges of a specific project are important (Evans et al., 2002). Projects continue to be built to original 
specifications even though the company has adopted new products or means of interacting with customers (Curran and 
Connally, 2001). Fourth is premature victory declarations, which are be caused by politics, fear, and pressures to deliver 
timely products (Evans et al., 2002). Fifth is a lack of program management leadership (Evans et al., 2002). Project leaders 
must communicate the role of technology in the organization, prioritize key projects, balance requirements against 
capabilities, manage political issues, and identify the impact of competitive, internal, societal, and governmental threats 
(Curran and Connally, 2001). Untimely decisions, where managers avoid making time-critical decisions until it is too late, 
are a problem. Finally, dysfunctional IT projects lack proactive risk management and are constantly reacting to problems 
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(Evans et al., 2002). Management must be aware of both internal and external risks associated with a project, and they must 
be prepared with contingency plans and fallback positions (Pyra and Trask, 2002). 
 
DTS Project Problems 
 
DTS has several characteristics in common with other dysfunctional IT projects. First, DTS did not implement essential 
project management practices, as pointed out by an Inspector General Audit in 2002 (Inspector General, 2002). DTS was 
being developed without the requirements, cost, performance and schedule documents, and analyses needed to assess 
system’s effectiveness and ROI. Thus the project carried the risk that the additional funding of $377.1 million being 
requested to develop DTS between 2002 and 2007, along with the $114.8 million and six years of effort already invested, 
would not fully realize all system goals (Inspector General, 2002). 
 
Unwarranted optimism was apparent; the initial DTS contract required deployment within 120 days from the effective date of 
the contract (September 1998) and complete deployment within 38 months (Inspector General, 2002). However, after testing 
began in 1998, project management officials discovered that the travel system was more cumbersome than anticipated.  In 
1999 it was obvious to project management officials that the COTS would require major development and modifications to 
meet requirements. The PMO does not expect full deployment of the DTS until FY 2006 (Taylor, 2003). The DTS project 
has failed to keep pace with current technology, which is evidence of failure to implement effective software processes. DoD 
is piloting five-year-old technology and paying to modify it (Taylor, 2003). The PMO included features in its original 
solicitation that are no longer required by DoD personnel, although they are still paying for these features (French, 2004). 
Premature victory declaration was a DTS characteristic. The first declaration was in November 1998 when DTS was 
supposed to be used by 50,000 DoD travelers, and the system would be fully implemented in three years (Taylor, 1998). In 
1998, OMB continued to discuss their optimism in DTS saving DoD money by 1999 (Taylor, 1998).  In 2000 PMO declared 
that testing had been successful and they were excited to move forward (Saldarini, 2000). Critics of the project declare DTS a 
complete failure, costing tax payers in excess of $400 million and costing approximately $33,000 per transaction (French, 
2004). The DTS project has gone through several leaders since its inception (Taylor, 2003). 
 
DTS has suffered from untimely decision making. The project was put on hold in 1998 for three months during a dispute over 
the contract award (Friel, 1998; Taylor, 1998). There was a delay caused by the incompatibility of DTS with DoD firewalls, 
which took two years to resolve (Taylor, 2000). There was uncertainty about the future of DTS during 2001, when Defense 
officials conducted functional and technical assessments to determine if it was meeting department requirements (Lunney, 
2001a).  It was feared that the project would be completely scrapped (Lunney, 2001b). In 2002, the PMO requested $86 
million in additional funding; the request was denied by Congress (Ballard, 2002). In 2002, the Inspector General 
recommended cancellation of the project (Inspector General, 2002). These delays have severely affected the DTS project 
(Taylor, 2003). DTS lacked proactive risk management, which the Inspector General blamed on DoD not managing it as an 
acquisition investment in IT, but as a special-interest initiative. DTS officials by-passed the Clinger-Cohen Act, OMB 
guidance, and DoD policy on managing IT projects.  DTS officials have reacted to issues, rather than be proactive, because of 





DoD examined the benefits of COTS in the early 1990’s. A 1994 study (DSB, 1994) stated that “DoD’s investment in 
software requires greater DoD-wide management control and oversight in the coming years if the department is to exploit the 
use of commercial software acquisition practices fully, as well as rapid advances in software technology.” The study 
recommended that the under secretary of defense (acquisition and technology) have responsibility for DoD-wide software 
technology, practices, and acquisition. Unfortunately, DTS was not considered an investment in IT but a special interest 
initiative. Therefore, there was no DoD management control or oversight on the project board (Inspector General, 2002). 
 
PMO should review lessons learned from other DoD COTS projects, because COTS does not normally suit all DoD needs. 
PMO should have decided early in the process if the performance gap could be accepted without degrading performance 
(ITRB, 1999). The analysis was not completed, because it was not until 1999 that the PMO decided that the COTS would 
require major redevelopment and modifications to meet DoDs requirements (Taylor, 2003). PMO would have been aware of 
this gap in COTS before acquisition if a gap analysis had been completed (ITRB, 1999). COTS can save development time, 
but once customization begins, cost and time savings are often eliminated (Alford, 2000). Once the DTS is deployed 
throughout DoD the contractor will have a virtual monopoly that will allow them to continue to overcharge the government 
(French, 2004). Critics believe the DTS project should have been stopped once it was obvious that COTS would not meet 
DoDs requirements (Taylor, 2003). 




DTS has been a problem since its inception. The estimated cost of DTS in 2002 was $491.9 million, therefore each of the 
15,000 tickets issued as of September, 2004, have cost taxpayers $33,000. The project is projected to cost $537 million by 
completion (twice the amount of the original contract), but it is highly unlikely that a fully functional DTS will be achieved 
by September, 2006 (French, 2004). Missed deadlines and budget overruns are characteristic of other dysfunctional IT 
projects. In addition, DTS doesn’t seem to have followed the lessons learned from other DoD COTS projects.  Despite the 
problems, DoD continues to spend money on DTS, and has refused to look at better e-travel alternatives although they 
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